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Abstract. Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) is a dependability analysis tech-
nique that has been widely used to predict reliability, availability and
safety of many complex engineering systems. Traditionally, these FTA-
based analyses are done using paper-and-pencil proof methods or com-
puter simulations, which cannot ascertain absolute correctness due to
their inherent limitations. As a complementary approach, we propose to
use the higher-order-logic theorem prover HOL4 to conduct the FTA-
based analysis of safety-critical systems where accuracy of failure anal-
ysis is a dire need. In particular, the paper presents a higher-order-logic
formalization of generic Fault Tree gates, i.e., AND, OR, NAND, NOR,
XOR and NOT and the formal verification of their failure probability ex-
pressions. Moreover, we have formally verified the generic probabilistic
inclusion-exclusion principle, which is one of the foremost requirements
for conducting the FTA-based failure analysis of any given system. For
illustration purposes, we conduct the FTA-based failure analysis of a so-
lar array that is used as the main source of power for the Dong Fang
Hong-3 (DFH-3) satellite.
Keywords: Higher-order Logic, Probabilistic Analysis, Theorem Prov-
ing, Satellite’s Solar Arrays
1 Introduction
With the increasing usage of engineering systems in safety-critical domains, their
dependability and failure analysis [1] has become a dire need to predict their
reliability, availability and safety. One of the most widely used dependability and
failure analysis techniques is the Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) method [2]. It is a
graphical technique consisting of internal nodes, which are represented by gates
like OR, AND and XOR, and the external nodes, that model the events which
are associated with the occurrence of faults in sub-systems or components of the
given system. The generic nature of these gates and events allows us to construct
an efficient and accurate fault tree (FT) model for any given system. This FT
can in turn be used to investigate the potential causes of a fault occurrence
? The final publication is available at http://link.springer.com
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in a system and the calculation of minimal number of events that contribute
towards the occurrence of a top event, i.e., a critical event, which can cause the
whole system failure upon its occurrence. Some noteworthy applications of FTA
include the failure analysis of transportation systems [3], healthcare systems [4]
and aerospace systems [5].
Traditionally, FTA is carried out by using paper-and-pencil proof methods,
computer simulations and computer algebra systems. The first step in the paper-
and-pencil proof methods is the construction of the FT of the given system on a
paper. This is followed by the identification of the Minimal Cut Set (MCS) failure
events, which contribute in the occurrence of the top event. These MCS failure
events are generally modeled in terms of the exponential or weibull random
variables and the Probabilistic Inclusion-Exclusion (PIE) principle [6] is then
used to evaluate the exact probability of failure of the given system. However,
this method is prone to human errors when it comes to the MCS and failure
probability assessment of large safety-critical systems. For instance, in nuclear
plants, where a fault tree model involves 50 to 130 levels of logic gates between
the top event and the lowest basic events that are contributing to the top event
[7]. So, there is a possibility, that many of these basic failure events may be
overlooked while calculating MCS and thus not further incorporated in the FTA,
which may lead to erroneous designs.
The FTA-based computer simulators, such as Relia-Soft [8] and ASENT Re-
liability analysis tools [9], provide graphical editors for the construction of FTs
and the analysis is carried out by generating samples from the exponential and
Weibull random variables that are associated with the events of the FT. These
samples are then processed to evaluate the reliability and the failure probability
of the complete system using computer arithmetic and numerical techniques. Al-
though, these tools provide a more scalable alternative to the paper-and-pencil
proof methods but the computational requirement increases drastically as the
size of the FT increases. For example, if there are q terms involves in the MCS
of a given FT then the total number of terms in the corresponding PIE principle
will be 2q − 1. In addition, these tools cannot ascertain absolute correctness or
error-free analysis because of the involvement of pseudo random numbers and
numerical methods and the inherent sampling-based nature of simulation.
Similarly, computer algebra systems (CAS), such as Mathematica [10], pro-
vide extensive features for FT-based failure analysis. For instance, the MCS
expressions for any given system can be validated with failure distributions,
such as Exponential or Weibull, by using symbolic and numerical algorithms.
However, due to the presence of these unverified simplification algorithms, the
analysis provided by CAS cannot be termed as sound and accurate.
Formal methods can overcome the above-mentioned inaccuracy limitations
of the traditional techniques and thus have been used for FTA. The Interval
Temporal Logic (ITS), i.e., a temporal logic that supports first-order logic, has
been used, along with the Karlsruhe Interactive Verifier (KIV), for formal FTA
of a rail-road crossing [11]. The work presented in [12] describes a deductive
method for FT construction, in contrast to the intuitive approach followed in
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[11], by using the Observational Transition Systems (OTS) [12] and then the
formal analysis of this FT is carried out using CafeOBJ [13], which is a formal
specification language with interactive verification support. One of the main lim-
itations of all the above-mentioned formal methods based works is the inability
to conduct a probability theoretic FTA. The COMPASS tool-set [14], which is
developed at RWTH Achen University in collaboration with the European Space
Agency (ESA), caters for this problem and supports the formal FTA specifically
for aerospace systems using the NuSMV and MRMC model checkers. However,
the scope of these tools is somewhat limited in terms of handling failure analysis
of large FTs, due to the inherent state-space explosion problem of model check-
ing, and the fact that the computation of probabilities in these methods involve
numerical methods, which compromises the accuracy of the results.
An accurate MCS calculation and exact failure probability assessment in the
FTA is very important specially while dealing with safety-critical systems used
in domains like transportation, aerospace or medicine. In order to achieve an ac-
curate and precise FTA, we propose to conduct the formal FTA within the sound
core of a higher-order-logic theorem prover [15]. Higher-order logic provides a
precise deductive mechanism that can be used to model any mathematically
expressive behavior including recursive definitions, random variables, fault tree
events, which are the foremost building blocks for modeling FTs. Once the FTs
are modeled in higher-order logic, we can deduce an accurate MCS by using
formal reasoning based on the set-theoretic foundations. Moreover, FT proper-
ties, such as the probability of failure, can be formally verified using interactive
theorem provers based on the PIE principles.
The foremost requirement for reasoning about reliability and failure related
properties of a system in a theorem prover is the availability of the higher-order-
logic formalization of probability theory. Hurd’s formalization of measure and
probability theories [16] is a pioneering work in this regard. Building upon this
formalization most of the commonly-used continuous random variables [17] and
some reliability theory fundamentals [18] have been formalized using the HOL
theorem prover. However, Hurd’s formalization of probability theory [16] only
supports the whole universe as the probability space. This feature limits its scope
in many aspects [19] and one of the main limitations, related to FTA-based anal-
ysis, is the nonability to reason about multiple continuous random variables [17].
Some recent probability theory formalizations [19,20] allow using any arbitrary
probability space that is a subset of the universe and thus are more flexible
than Hurd’s formalization of probability theory. Particularly, Mhamdi’s proba-
bility theory formalization [19], which is based on extended-real numbers (real
numbers including ±∞), has been recently used to reason about the Reliability
Block Diagram (RBD)-based analysis of a series pipelines structure [21], which
involves multiple exponential random variables. The current paper is mainly in-
spired from this development as we use Mhamdi’s formalized probability theory
[19] for the formalization of all the commonly used FTA gates and the formal
verification of their probabilistic properties. Moreover, we have also formally
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verified the PIE principle, which provides the foremost foundation for formal
reasoning about the accurate failure analysis of any FT.
In order to illustrate the effectiveness of the proposed FTA approach, the
paper presents a formal failure analysis, by taking a FT model, of a solar array
that has been used in the DFH-3 Satellite, which was launched by the People’s
Republic of China on May 12, 1997 [5]. Solar arrays are one of the most vital
components of the satellites because the mission success heavily depends upon
the continuous reliable source of power [22]. Over the last ten years, 12 out of
the 117 satellite’s solar array anomalies, documented by the Airclaims Ascend
SpaceTrak database, led to the total satellite failure [23,22]. Thus the absolute
accuracy of the failure analysis of a solar array is a dire need in satellite missions
and, to the best of our knowledge, it is the novelty of the proposed technique to
meet this requirement. The satellite’s solar array is a mechanical system, which
mainly consists of various mechanisms, including: deployable, synchronization,
locking and orientation. The FT of the solar array contains the failure events
of these mechanisms and their interrelationships regarding the overall system
failure. The paper presents the higher-order-logic modeling of this FT and the
formal verification of the probability of failure of satellite’s solar array system
based on the probability of occurrence of the above-mentioned mechanism faults.
2 Probability Theory in HOL
In this section, we provide a brief overview of the HOL4 formalization of the
probability theory [19], which we build upon in this paper. Based on the mea-
sure theoretic foundations, a probability space is defined as a triple (Ω,Σ, Pr),
where Ω is a set, called the sample space, Σ represents a σ-algebra of subsets
of Ω, where the subsets are usually referred to as measurable sets, and Pr is a
measure with domain Σ and is 1 for the whole sample space. In the HOL4 proba-
bility theory formalization [19], given a probability space p, the functions space
and subsets return the corresponding Ω and Σ, respectively. Based on this
definition, all the basic probability axioms have been verified. Now, a random
variable is a measurable function between a probability space and a measurable
space, which essentially is a pair (S,A), where S denotes a set and A represents
a nonempty collection of sub-sets of S. A random variable is termed as discrete
if S is a set with finite elements and continuous otherwise.
The cumulative distribution function (CDF) is defined as the probability of
the event where a random variable X has a value less than or equal to some value
x, i.e., Pr(X ≤ x). This definition characterizes the distribution of both discrete
and continuous random variables and has been formalized [21] as follows:
` ∀ p X x. CDF p X x = distribution p X {y | y ≤ Normal x}
The function Normal takes a real number as its input and converts it to its
corresponding value in the extended-real data-type, i.e, it is the real data-type
with the inclusion of positive and negative infinity. The function distribution
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takes three parameters: a probability space p, a random variable X and a set of
extended-real numbers and returns the probability of the given random variable
X acquiring all the values of the given set in probability space p.
The unreliability or the probability of failure F (t) is defined as the proba-
bility that a system or component will fail by the time t. It can be described in
terms of CDF, known as the failure distribution function, if the random variable
X represent a time-to-failure of the component. This time-to-failure random
variable X usually exhibits the exponential or weibull distribution.
The notion of mutual independence of n random variables is a major require-
ment for reasoning about the failure analysis of most of the FT gates. According
to this notion, if we have N mutually independent failure events then
Pr(
N⋂
i=1
Li) =
N∏
i=1
Pr(Li) (1)
This concept has been formalized as follows [21]:
` ∀ p L. mutual indep p L = ∀ L1 n. PERM L L1 ∧
1 ≤ n ∧ n ≤ LENGTH L ⇒
prob p (inter list p (TAKE n L1)) =
list prod (list prob p (TAKE n L1))
The function mutual indep accepts a list of events L and probability space p
and returns True if the events in the given list are mutually independent in
the probability space p. The predicate PERM ensures that its two list arguments
form a permutation of one another. The function LENGTH returns the length of
the given list. The function TAKE returns the first n elements of its argument
list as a list. The function inter list performs the intersection of all the sets
in its argument list of sets and returns the probability space if the given list of
sets is empty. The function list prob takes a list of events and returns a list of
probabilities associated with the events in the given list of events in the given
probability space. Finally, the function list prod recursively multiplies all the
elements in the given list of real numbers. Using these functions, the function
mutual indep models the mutual independence condition such that for any 1
or more events n taken from any permutation of the given list L, the property
Pr(
⋂N
i=1 Li) =
∏N
i=1 Pr(Li) holds.
3 Formalization of Fault Tree Gates
In this section, we describe a generic formalization of commonly used FT gates
given in Table 1. Our formalizations are generic in terms of the number of inputs
n, i.e., our definitions can be used to model arbitrary-input FT gates.
3.1 Formal Definitions of Fault Tree Gates
If the occurrence of the output failure event is caused by the occurrence of all the
input failure events then this kind of behavior can be modeled by using the AND
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Table 1: HOL4 Formalization of Fault Tree Gates
Fault Tree Gates HOL Formalization
` ∀ p L. AND FT gate p L = inter list p L
` ∀ L. OR FT gate L = union list L
` ∀ p L1 L2. NAND FT gate p L1 L2 =
inter list p (compl list p L1) ∩ inter list p L2
` ∀ p L. NOR FT gate p L = p space p DIFF (OR gate L)
` ∀ p A B. XOR FT gate p A B =
((p space p DIFF A ∩ B) ∪ (A ∩ p space p DIFF B))
` ∀ p A. NOT FT gate p A = (p space p DIFF A)
FT gate. The function AND FT gate, given in Table 1, models this behavior as
it accepts an arbitrary probability space p and returns the intersection of input
failure events, given in the list L, by using the recursive function inter list.
In the OR FT gate, the occurrence of the output failure event depends upon
the occurrence of any one of its input failure event. The function OR FT gate,
given in Table 1, models this behavior as it returns the union of the input
failure list L by using the recursive function union list. The NOR FT gate can
be viewed as the complement of the OR FT gate and its output failure event
occurs if none of the input failure event occurs.
The NAND FT gate models the behavior of the occurrence of an output
failure event when at least one of the failure events at its input does not occur.
This type of gate is used in FTs when the non-occurrence of the failure event in
conjunction with the other failure events causes the top failure event to occur.
This behavior can be expressed as the intersection of complementary and nor-
mal events [1], where the complementary events model the non-occurring failure
events and the normal events model occurring failure events. It is important
to note that the behavior of the NAND FT gate is usually not captured by
the complement of the AND FT gate in the FTA literature [1]. The function
NAND FT gate accepts a probability space p and two list of failure events L1 and
L2. The function returns the intersection of non-occurring failure events, which
in turn is modeled by passing the list of failure events L1 to the recursive func-
tion compl list, and occurring failure events, which are given in the list L2, by
utilizing the recursive function inter list. The function compl list returns a
list of events such that each element of this list is the difference between the
probability space p and the corresponding element of the given list.
The output failure event occurs in the 2-input XOR FT gate if only one,
and not both, of its input failure events occur. The HOL representation of the
behaviour of the XOR FT gate is presented in Table 1. The function NOT FT gate
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accepts an arbitrary failure event A along with probability space p and returns
the complement to the probability space p of the given input failure event A.
3.2 Formal Verification of Failure Probability of Fault Tree Gates
The function AND FT gate, given in Table 1, can be used to evaluate the failure
probability of the output failure event of the AND FT gate. If Ai represents
the ith failure event with failure probability Fi at time t among the n mutually
independent failure events of the AND FT gate then the generic mathematical
expression for the failure probability of a n-input AND FT gate is as follows:
FAND gate(t) = Pr(
N⋂
i=2
Ai(t)) =
N∏
i=2
Fi(t) (2)
We formally verified this expression as the following theorem in HOL4:
Theorem 1: ` ∀ p L. prob space p ∧
2 ≤ LENGTH L ∧ mutual indep p L ⇒
(prob p (AND gate p L) = list prod (list prob p L))
The first assumption ensure that p is a valid probability space based on the
probability theory in HOL4 [19]. The next two assumptions guarantee that the
list of failure events must have at least two failure event and the failure events
are mutually independent, respectively. The conclusion of the theorem represents
Equation (2). The proof of Theorem 1 is primarily based on some probability
theory axioms and the mutual independence definition.
Similarly, if Ai represents the i
th with failure event failure probability Fi at
time t among the n mutually independent failure events of an OR FT gate then
its failure probability expression is as follows:
FOR gate(t) = Pr(
N⋃
i=2
Ai(t)) = 1−
N∏
i=2
(1− Fi(t)) (3)
In order to formally verify the above equation, we first formally verify the
following lemma that provides an alternate expression for the failure probability
of an OR FT gate in terms of the failure probability of an AND FT gate:
Lemma 1: ` ∀ L p. (prob space p) ∧
(∀ x’. MEM x’ L ⇒ x’ ∈ events p) ⇒
(prob p (OR gate L) =
1 - prob p (AND gate p (compl list p L))
Now, we can formally verify Equation (3) in HOL4 as follows:
Theorem 2: ` ∀ p L. (prob space p) ∧
(2 ≤ LENGTH L) ∧ (mutual indep p L) ∧
(∀ x’. MEM x’ L ⇒ x’ ∈ events p) ⇒
(prob p (OR gate L) =
1 - list prod (one minus list (list prob p L)))
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Where the function one minus list accepts a list of real numbers [x1, x2, · · · , xn]
and returns the list of real numbers such that each element of this list is 1 minus
the corresponding element of the given list, i.e., [1− x1, 1− x2, · · · , 1− xn]. The
proof of Theorem 2 is primarily based on Lemma 1 and Theorem 1 along with
the fact that given the list of n mutually independent events, the complement
of these n events are also mutually independent.
Similarly, we also verified the failure probability theorems for other FT gates,
given in Table 1, and the corresponding mathematical expressions and theorems
are given in Table 2. All these results are verified under the same assumptions
as the ones used in Theorems 1 and 2.
Table 2: Probability of Failure of Fault Tree Gates
Fault Tree Gates Theorem’s Conclusion
FNOR(t) = 1− FOR(t)
=
N∏
i=2
(1− Fi(t))
(prob p (NOR FT gate p L) =
list prod (one minus list
(list prob p L)))
FNAND(t) = Pr(
k⋂
i=2
Ai(t) ∩
N⋂
j=k
Ai(t))
=
k∏
i=2
(1− Fi(t)) ∗
N∏
j=k
(Fj(t))
(prob p (NAND FT gate p L1 L2) =
list prod ((list prob p
(compl list p L1))) *
list prod (list prob p L2))
FXOR(t) = Pr(A¯(t)B(t) ∪A(t)B¯(t))
= (1− FA(t))FB(t)+
FA(t)(1− FB(t))
(prob p (XOR FT gate p A B) =
(1- prob p A)*prob p B +
prob p A*(1 - prob p B)
FNOT (t) = Pr(A(t))
= (1− FA(t))
prob p (NOT FT gate p A) =
(1 - prob p A)
The proof script [24] of the above-mentioned formalization is composed of
4000 lines of HOL script and took about 200 man-hours. The main outcome of
this exercise is that the definitions, given in Table 1, can be used to capture the
behavior of most of the FTs in higher-order logic and the Theorems of Table
2 can then be used in conjunction with the formalization of the PIE principle,
explained next, to formally verify the corresponding failure probabilities.
4 Formalization of Probabilistic Inclusion-Exclusion
Principle
The probabilistic inclusion-exclusion principle (PIE) forms an integral part of
the reasoning involved in verifying the failure probability of a FT. In FTA,
firstly all the basic fault events are identified that can cause the occurrence
of the system failure event. These fault events are then combined to model
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the overall fault behavior of the given system by using the fault gates. These
combinations of basic failure events, called cut sets, are then reduced to minimal
cut sets (MCS) by using some set-theory rules, such as idempotent, associative
and commutative [25]. At this point, the PIE principle is used to evaluate the
overall failure probability of the given system based on the MCS events.
If Ai represent the i
th basic failure event or a combination of failure event
then the failure probability of the given system can be expressed in terms of the
probabilistic inclusion-exclusion principle as follows:
P(
n⋃
i=1
Ai) =
∑
t 6={},t⊆{1,2,...,n}
(−1)|t|+1P(
⋂
j∈t
Aj) (4)
The above equation can be formalized in HOL4 is as follows:
Theorem 3: ` ∀ p L1 L2. prob space p ∧
(∀ x. MEM x L ⇒ x ∈ events p) ⇒
(prob p (union list L) =
sum set {t | t ⊆ set L ∧ t 6= {} }
(λt. -1 pow (CARD t + 1) * prob p (BIGINTER t)))
The assumptions of the above theorem are the same as the ones used in Theorem
1. The function sum set takes an arbitrary set s with element of type α and a
real-valued function f . It recursively sums the return value of the function f ,
which is applied on each element of the given set s. In the above theorem, the
set s is represented by the term {x|C(x)} that contains all the values of x, which
satisfy condition C. Whereas, the λ abstraction function (λt. -1 pow (CARD
t + 1) * prob p (BIGINTER t)) models (−1)|t|+1P(⋂j∈tAj), such that the
functions CARD and BIGINTER return the number of elements and the intersection
of all the elements of the given set, respectively. Thus, the conclusion of the
theorem represents Equation (4).
The formal reasoning about Theorem 3 is based upon the following lemma:
Lemma 2: ` ∀ P. (∀ n. (∀ m. m < n ⇒ P m) ⇒ P n) ⇒ ∀ n. P n
Where n in our case is the length of the list L and m represent another list
whose length is less then the length of the list L. The predicate P represents the
conclusion of Theorem 3. The above property brings an important hypothesis in
the assumption list, which has the same form as that of the conclusion of Theo-
rem 3. Then, by utilizing induction and some properties of the function sum set
along with some fundamental axioms of probability, we can verify Theorem 3.
The proof script [24] for Theorem 3 is composed of 1000 lines of HOL code and
involved 50 man-hours of proof effort. To the best of our knowledge, this is the
first formal verification of the probabilistic inclusion exclusion principle, which,
besides being used in FTA, is a widely used mathematical result in analyzing
various bio-informatics [26] and telecommunication [27] systems.
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5 Application: Satellite’s Solar Array
The solar arrays used in satellite missions are usually in a folded position during
the launch phase [5]. Once the satellite is deployed in the corresponding orbit
then the solar arrays are unfolded and the goal is to keep them oriented towards
the sun all the time to maximize the power generation for the satellite [5]. The
faults in the solar array are mainly caused by the mechanical components that
drive these mechanisms associated with the driving, deployment, synchroniza-
tion, locking and orientation. For example, the solar array is usually driven by
using a torsion spring [5]. Whereas, the closed cable loop (CCL) and the stepping
or servo motors are used during the synchronization and orientation phases [5].
A FT can thus be constructed by considering the faults in these mechanical com-
ponents, which are the fundamental causes of satellite’ solar array mechanisms
failure The FT for the solar array of the DFH-3 Satellite that was launched by
the People’s Republic of China on May 12, 1997 [28] is depicted in Figure 1 and
we formally analyze this FT in this paper.
The failure events, A, B, C, D in Figure 1, represent the failures in the unlock
mechanism, deployment process, locking process and orientation process, respec-
tively. Whereas, the failure event E represents the failures in the corresponding
mechanical parts of the system. These failure events are combined either by
using the OR or AND FT gates by considering the behavior of the faults.
In order to formalize the solar array FT of Figure 1, we first present the formal
modeling of list of failure events that are associated with each corresponding fault
of the solar array FT.
Definition 1: ` ∀ p x. fail event list p [] x = [] ∧
∀ p x h t. fail event list p (h::t) x =
PREIMAGE h {y | y ≤ Normal x } ∩ p space p ::
fail event list p t x
The function fail event list accepts a probability space p, a list of random
variables, representing the failure time of individual components, and a real
number x, which represents the time index at which the failure of the component
occurs. It returns a list of events, representing the failure of all the individual
components at time x. The formal definitions of FT gates, given in Section 3,
along with Definition 1 can be utilized to formally represent the FT of satellite’s
solar array in terms of its cut-set failure events. The HOL4 formalization of
satellite’s solar array FT is as follows:
Definition 2: ` ∀ p x1 x2 x3 x4 x5 x6 x7 x8 x9 x10 x11
x12 x13 x14 t.
Solar FT p x1 x2 x3 x4 x5 x6 x7 x8 x9 x10 x11 x12 x13 x14 t =
OR FT gate [OR FT gate (fail event list p [x1; x2] t);
OR FT gate [OR FT gate (fail event list p [x3; x4] t);
AND FT gate p (fail event list p [x5; x6] t); OR FT gate
(fail event list p [x3; x7; x8] t)];
OR FT gate (fail event list p [x3; x9] t);
OR FT gate (fail event list p [x10; x11] t);
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OR FT gate [PREIMAGE x12 {y | y ≤ Normal t };
PREIMAGE x13 {y | y ≤ Normal t };
OR FT gate (fail event list p[x3; x14]t)]]
Where the random variables x1 − x14 model the time-to-failure of the solar
array processes and components as depicted in Figure 1. However, the cut-set
Fig. 1: FT of the Solar Array of the DFH-3 Satellite [5]
failure events in the above definition is not minimal [5], i.e., there are some
redundant failure events. For example, x3 is part of more than one OR FT gates.
These kind of redundant failure events can be removed by verifying an accurate
equivalent but reduced representation, i.e., the MCS, by using set theory laws,
like idempotent, commutative and associative, as follows:
Lemma 2: ` ∀ p x1 x2 x3 x4 x5 x6 x7 x8 x9 x10 x11 x12 x13 x14 t.
prob space p ⇒
(Solar FT p x1 x2 x3 x4 x5 x6 x7 x8 x9 x10 x11 x12 x13 x14 t =
OR FT gate [OR FT gate (fail event list p [x1; x2; x3; x4] t);
AND FT gate p (fail event list p [x5; x6] t);
OR FT gate
(fail event list p [x7; x8; x9; x10; x11; x12; x13; x14]t)])
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We consider that random variables, associated with the failure events of the
solar array FT, exhibit the exponential distribution, which can be formalized in
HOL4 as follows:
Definition 3: ` ∀ p X l. exp dist p X l =
∀ x. (CDF p X x = if 0 ≤ x then 1 - exp (-l * x) else 0)
The function exp dist guarantees that the CDF of the random variable X is
that of an exponential random variable with a failure rate l in a probability
space p. We classify a list of exponentially distributed random variables based
on this definition as follows:
Definition 4: ` ∀ p L. list exp p [] L = T ∧
∀ p h t L. list exp p (h::t) L =
exp dist p (HD L) h ∧ list exp p t (TL L)
The function list exp accepts a list of failure rates, a list of random variables
L and a probability space p. It guarantees that all elements of the list L are
exponentially distributed with the corresponding failure rates, given in the other
list, within the probability space p. For this purpose, it utilizes the list functions
HD and TL, which return the head and tail of a list, respectively. Now, the failure
probability of satellite’s solar array can be verified as the following theorem:
Theorem 4: ` ∀ p x1 x2 x3 x4 x5 x6 x7 x8 x9 x10 x11 x12 x13 x14 t c1
c2 c3 c4 c5 c6 c7 c8 c9 c10 c11 c12 c13 c14.
(0 ≤ t) ∧ (prob space p) ∧
(∀ x’. MEM x’ (fail event list p
([x1; x2; x3; x4; x5;
x6; x6; x7; x8; x9; x10; x11; x12; x13; x14]) t)) ⇒ x’ ∈ events p) ∧
(mutual indep p ((fail event list p
([x1; x2; x3; x4; x5; x6; x7; x8; x9; x10; x11; x12; x13; x14]) x))) ∧
list exp p
([c1; c2; c3; c4; c5; c6; c7; c8; c9; c10; c11; c12; c13; c14])
([x1; x2; x3; x4; x5; x6; x7; x8; x9; x10; x11; x12; x13; x14]) ⇒
(prob p (Solar FT p
x1 x2 x3 x4 x5 x6 x7 x8 x9 x10 x11 x12 x13 x14 t ) =
(1 - (exp -(t*(list sum [c1;c2;c3;c4])))) +
list prod(one minus exp t [c5;c6;c7]) +
(1 - (exp -(t*(list sum
[c7; c8; c9; c10; c11; c12; c13; c14])))) -
(1 - list prod(one minus exp prod t
[[c1;c5;c6];[c2;c5;c6];[c3;c5;c6];[c4;c5;c6]])) -
(1 - (exp -(t*(list sum [c1;c2;c3;c4])))) *
(1 - (exp -(t*(list sum
[c7; c8; c9; c10; c11; c12; c13; c14])))) -
(1 - list prod(one minus exp prod t
[[c5;c6;c7];[c5;c6;c8];[c5;c6;c9];[c5;c6;c10];
[c5;c6;c11];[c5;c6;c12];[c5;c6;c13];[c5;c6;c14]])) +
(1 - list prod(one minus exp prod t
[[c1;c5;c6];[c2;c5;c6];[c3;c5;c6];[c4;c5;c6]])) *
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(1 - (exp -(t*
(list sum [c7; c8; c9; c10; c11; c12; c13; c14])))))
The first assumption ensures the variable t that models time can acquire positive
values only. The second assumption ensure that p is a valid probability space
based on the probability theory in HOL4 [29]. The next two assumptions ensure
that the events corresponding to the failures modeled by the random variables
x1 to x14 are valid events from the probability space p and they are mutually
exclusive. Finally, the last assumption characterizes the random variables x1 to
x14 as exponential random variables with failure rates c1 to c14, respectively.
The conclusion of the Theorem 4 represents the failure probability of the given
solar array in terms of the failure rates of its components as follows:
(1− e−(c1+c2+c3+c4)t) +
6∏
i=5
(1− e−(cit))+
(1− e−(c7+c8+c9+c10+c11+c12+c13+c14)t)− (1−
4∏
i=1
(1−
6∏
j=5
[(1− e−cit)(1− e−cjt)]))−
(1− e−(c1+c2+c3+c4)t) ∗ (1− e−(c7+c8+c9+c10+c11+c12+c13+c14)t)−
(1−
14∏
i=7
(1−
6∏
j=5
[(1− e−cit)(1− e−cjt)]))+
(1−
4∏
i=1
(1−
6∏
j=5
[(1− e−cit)(1− e−cjt)])) ∗ (1− e−(c7+c8+c9+c10+c11+c12+c13+c14)t)
(5)
where the function exp represents a exponential function, the function list sum
is used to sum all the element of the given list of failure rates, the function
one minus exp accepts a list of failure rates and returns a one minus list of expo-
nentials and the function one minus exp prod accepts a two dimensional list of
failure rates and returns a list with one minus product of one minus exponentials
of every sub-list. For example, one minus exp prod[[c1; c2; c3]; [c4; c5]; [c6; c7; c8]]
x = [1 − ((1 − e−(c1)x) ∗ (1 − e−(c2)x) ∗ (1 − e−(c3)x)); (1 − (1 − e−(c4)x) ∗ (1 −
e−(c5)x)); (1− (1− e−(c6)x) ∗ (1− e−(c7)x) ∗ (1− e−(c8)x))].
The proof of the above theorem utilizes the failure probabilities of AND
and OR FT gates, given in Table 2, along with Lemma 2 and Theorem 3 and
some fundamental facts and axioms of probability theory. Due to the universally
quantified variables in Theorem 3, the proof of Theorem 4 is quite straight-
forward (about 800 lines of HOL code) as compared to that of Theorem 3. The
distinguishing features of the formally verified Theorem 4 includes its generic
nature, i.e., all the variables are universally quantified and thus can be specialized
to obtain the failure probability for any given failure rates, and its guaranteed
correctness due to the involvement of a sound theorem prover in its verification,
which ensures that all the required assumptions for the validity of the result are
accompanying the theorem.
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A fuzzy reasoning Petri Net (FRPN), which is a combination of fuzzy logic
[30] and Petri Nets [31], based failure analysis for the above-mentioned solar
array is presented in [5]. In this work, the FT of Figure 1 is first represented
as a Petri Net such that the gates are represented by transitions and the fail-
ure events are modeled as places. The possibility of fault occurrence is then
evaluated by using fuzzy degree of truth on the basis of petri nets transitions.
However, the truth degree values evaluated using these FRPN models cannot
be regarded as precise and sound as the formally verified expression using the
HOL theorem prover due to the involvement of numerical techniques and pseudo
randomness. On the other hand, our analysis result, i.e., Theorem 4, is based on
a probability theoretic formal reasoning, verified in a sound theorem prover and
is valid for all possible values of the failure rates. These features constitute the
main motivations of the work presented in this paper.
6 Conclusion
The accuracy of failure analysis is a dire need for safety and mission-critical
applications, where an incorrect failure analysis may lead to disastrous situations
including the loss of human lives or heavy financial setbacks. In this paper,
we presented an accurate FTA approach, based on higher-order-logic theorem
proving, to tackle the analysis of such critical systems. In particular the paper
presents a formalization of commonly used FT gates and the PIE principle, which
are the foremost foundations for formal reasoning about FTA within a sound core
of theorem prover. As a case-study, the paper also presents the formal failure
analysis of a satellite’s solar array.
Building upon the results, presented in this paper, other FT gates, such as
priority AND and voting OR gate, can also be formally modeled and thus the
scope of FTA-based formal reliability analysis [32] can be further enhanced.
Some interesting real-world applications that can benefit from our work include
transportation systems [3], healthcare systems [4] and avionics [33]. Moreover,
we also plan to further facilitate the formal FT-based failure analysis by incor-
porating the automatic simplification capabilities of CAS, such as Mathmatica,
for MCS calculation. This obtained MCS can then be validated within the sound
environment of the HOL theorem prover.
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